General concept of rhythm
Lefebvre’s concept of rhythm concerns the repetition of a measure at a frequency. He identifies two kinds of rhythms: cyclical rhythms, which involve simple intervals of repetition, and alternating (or linear) rhythms. An example of a cyclical rhythm would be day fading into night, and night brightening into day; a linear rhythm might be the flow of information from a television set. Additionally, rhythms may be nested within each other; for example, the broadcast of the local news at set intervals throughout the day, throughout the week, is an example of a nested rhythm. In a less abstract fashion (or perhaps only abstract in a different fashion), Lefebvre asserts that rhythms exist at the intersection of place, time and the expenditure of energy.
Lefebvre posits that the human body is composed of several rhythms; in order to observe rhythms outside of the body, the rhythmanalyst must use his or her own rhythms as a reference to unify the rhythms under analysis. Properly put, the rhythm is the conjunction of the rhythmanalyst and the object of the analysis.
[edit] The act of rhythmanalysis
Rhythms are only perceptible through the traditional five senses; accordingly, it is possible to conceptualize rhythms as being composed of sense triggers (smells, sights, sounds, etc.) Lefebvre cautions against this conceptualization however; he specifically notes that rhythm is not meant to refer always to its more traditional referents, musical and dance rhythm (although it could, so long as the rhythmanalysis concerned either music or dancing). He also cautions against taking the mere repetition of a movement to indicate a rhythm.
The object of rhythmanalysis is to access the obscure property of the rhythm called ‘presence.’
The sensory events through which the rhythmanalyst perceives the rhythm are called ‘simulacra,’ or simply ‘the present.’
The need for rhythmanalysis arises out of the propensity [ tamayol]of the present to simulate presence..... Entropy
[edit] Presence
Lefebvre describes presence as the “facts of both nature and culture, at the same time sensible, affective and moral rather than imaginary” (author’s emphasis)
I do not agree
. (Elden and Moore translation) Rhythmanalysis stresses that presence is of an innately temporal character and can never be represented by any simulacrum of the present (people walking down a street, the sun going down), but can only be grasped through the analysis of rhythms (people walking down a street through time, the sun’s movement through time).
[edit] Present
The present consists of one’s sensory perceptions. Lefebvre frequently warns of “the trap of the present” wherein the present is always trying to pass itself off as presence, the rhythmanalytical truth of a situation. “The trap of the present” relies on false representation. Lefebvre argues that the present engages in a commodification of reality when it successfully passes itself off as presence.
[edit] Characteristics of rhythms
Lefebvre describes four alignments of rhythms. They are:
* Arrhythmia, conflict or dissonance between or among two or more rhythms, such as might occur (biologically) in an ill person;
* Polyrhythmia, co-existence of two or more rhythms without the conflict or dissonance that suggests arrhythmia;
* Eurhythmia, constructive interaction between or among two or more rhythms, such as occurs in healthy creatures;
* Isorhythmia, the rarest association between rhythms, implies equivalence of repetition, measure and frequency.
18.1.10
Characteristics of rhythms
Characteristics of rhythms
Lefebvre describes four alignments of rhythms. They are:
* Arrhythmia, conflict or dissonance between or among two or more rhythms, such as might occur (biologically) in an ill person;
* Polyrhythmia, co-existence of two or more rhythms without the conflict or dissonance that suggests arrhythmia;
* Eurhythmia, constructive interaction between or among two or more rhythms, such as occurs in healthy creatures;
* Isorhythmia, the rarest association between rhythms, implies equivalence of repetition, measure and frequency.
Lefebvre describes four alignments of rhythms. They are:
* Arrhythmia, conflict or dissonance between or among two or more rhythms, such as might occur (biologically) in an ill person;
* Polyrhythmia, co-existence of two or more rhythms without the conflict or dissonance that suggests arrhythmia;
* Eurhythmia, constructive interaction between or among two or more rhythms, such as occurs in healthy creatures;
* Isorhythmia, the rarest association between rhythms, implies equivalence of repetition, measure and frequency.
'There are two ways to build. One way is to strive for absolute perfection and then wage a desperate and invariably losing battle to preserve it. The other is to accept that perfection is not just unattainable but also unnecessary, thereby making time's passage an ally instead of an enemy' - Arrol Gellner
Architecture is not a static object. - A building over its life occupies more than a topography, it occupies a timeography, a period over time in which it is affected by forces which change it. Once an architecture is born (built) it begins its life in its perfect state then begins to change due to the forces acting on it. The inevitability of change is a reality that architects rarely embrace on the design table. Change in buildings usually takes the form of decay - where the original design state degrades and no longer resembles its intent. Decay is a term which describes change that is either unanticipated or was not embraced as a future model of existence for the building. Buildings are built for the present. They are designed to be and to look, as they do the day they are "born". A building designed only for the present - is not designed for a real context - but a fictional one. (le corbusiers building and how it looked after time-oliver).
Few buildings today embrace change, anticipating the forces that will act upon it and using these to evolve the building aesthetically or formally-through design. A building of this kind is never finished, it navigates between different states of being. It matures, it changes, but it does not decay.
Cities are, even more so, agents of time. A city is never static - it is constantly evolving, growing, regenerating itself. I reject any notion of a city that is designed as an artifact, rather than a system for inevitable growth or adaptation. The design of a city should therefore be more of a choreography, an orchestration of change, not a final vision in-the-making.
In our current context, change is becoming increasingly noticeable. The acceleration of technology, the rapid expansion of cities, the diminishing timescales of style in fashion, music, and even architecture which were once transforming over centuries, are transforming our surroundings and our lifestyles in decades - to a degree noticeable several times over within our lifetimes.
Perhaps human beings are not very good at thinking along long timescales. The general attitudes toward oil consumption and surmounting evidence on global warming and its effects are good examples of an "out of sight, out of mind" attitude toward the future. I propose that we as designers reconsider the way we view design - understanding it in the fourth dimensional context in which it exists, and examine a possibility for architecture far deeper and richer in its experience than the sum total of a rendering can offer.
--- i think i've distilled my interest into this one topic which can help simplify my project to a focus (and away from meaning through architecture and my interpretations of civilization being at the foreground) This single theme ties both the crawling city and the archive together to a single interest or investigation and sets up the reasoning for why to choose an post-civilization archive as a program precisely as a program which both organizes (programmatically) and is precisely intended for changes over time and long timescale thinking about architecture. I will steer the project more in this direction.
Architecture is not a static object. - A building over its life occupies more than a topography, it occupies a timeography, a period over time in which it is affected by forces which change it. Once an architecture is born (built) it begins its life in its perfect state then begins to change due to the forces acting on it. The inevitability of change is a reality that architects rarely embrace on the design table. Change in buildings usually takes the form of decay - where the original design state degrades and no longer resembles its intent. Decay is a term which describes change that is either unanticipated or was not embraced as a future model of existence for the building. Buildings are built for the present. They are designed to be and to look, as they do the day they are "born". A building designed only for the present - is not designed for a real context - but a fictional one. (le corbusiers building and how it looked after time-oliver).
Few buildings today embrace change, anticipating the forces that will act upon it and using these to evolve the building aesthetically or formally-through design. A building of this kind is never finished, it navigates between different states of being. It matures, it changes, but it does not decay.
Cities are, even more so, agents of time. A city is never static - it is constantly evolving, growing, regenerating itself. I reject any notion of a city that is designed as an artifact, rather than a system for inevitable growth or adaptation. The design of a city should therefore be more of a choreography, an orchestration of change, not a final vision in-the-making.
In our current context, change is becoming increasingly noticeable. The acceleration of technology, the rapid expansion of cities, the diminishing timescales of style in fashion, music, and even architecture which were once transforming over centuries, are transforming our surroundings and our lifestyles in decades - to a degree noticeable several times over within our lifetimes.
Perhaps human beings are not very good at thinking along long timescales. The general attitudes toward oil consumption and surmounting evidence on global warming and its effects are good examples of an "out of sight, out of mind" attitude toward the future. I propose that we as designers reconsider the way we view design - understanding it in the fourth dimensional context in which it exists, and examine a possibility for architecture far deeper and richer in its experience than the sum total of a rendering can offer.
--- i think i've distilled my interest into this one topic which can help simplify my project to a focus (and away from meaning through architecture and my interpretations of civilization being at the foreground) This single theme ties both the crawling city and the archive together to a single interest or investigation and sets up the reasoning for why to choose an post-civilization archive as a program precisely as a program which both organizes (programmatically) and is precisely intended for changes over time and long timescale thinking about architecture. I will steer the project more in this direction.
17.1.10
RHYTHMANALYSIS
Rhythmanalysis
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Rhythmanalysis is a collection of essays by Marxist sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre. The book outlines a method for analyzing the rhythms of urban spaces and the effects of those rhythms on the inhabitants of those spaces. It builds on his past work, with which he argued space is a production of social practices.
The book is considered to be the fourth volume in his series Critique of Everyday Life. Published in 1992 after his death, Rhythmanalysis is the last book Lefebvre wrote.
General concept of rhythm
Lefebvre’s concept of rhythm concerns the repetition of a measure at a frequency. He identifies two kinds of rhythms: cyclical rhythms, which involve simple intervals of repetition, and alternating (or linear) rhythms. An example of a cyclical rhythm would be day fading into night, and night brightening into day; a linear rhythm might be the flow of information from a television set. Additionally, rhythms may be nested within each other; for example, the broadcast of the local news at set intervals throughout the day, throughout the week, is an example of a nested rhythm. In a less abstract fashion (or perhaps only abstract in a different fashion), Lefebvre asserts that rhythms exist at the intersection of place, time and the expenditure of energy.
Lefebvre posits that the human body is composed of several rhythms; in order to observe rhythms outside of the body, the rhythmanalyst must use his or her own rhythms as a reference to unify the rhythms under analysis. Properly put, the rhythm is the conjunction of the rhythmanalyst and the object of the analysis.
The act of rhythmanalysis
Rhythms are only perceptible through the traditional five senses; accordingly, it is possible to conceptualize rhythms as being composed of sense triggers (smells, sights, sounds, etc.) Lefebvre cautions against this conceptualization however; he specifically notes that rhythm is not meant to refer always to its more traditional referents, musical and dance rhythm (although it could, so long as the rhythmanalysis concerned either music or dancing). He also cautions against taking the mere repetition of a movement to indicate a rhythm.
The object of rhythmanalysis is to access the obscure property of the rhythm called ‘presence.’ The sensory events through which the rhythmanalyst perceives the rhythm are called ‘simulacra,’ or simply ‘the present.’ The need for rhythmanalysis arises out of the propensity of the present to simulate presence.
[edit]Presence
Lefebvre describes presence as the “facts of both nature and culture, at the same time sensible, affective and moral rather than imaginary” (author’s emphasis). (Elden and Moore translation) Rhythmanalysis stresses that presence is of an innately temporal character and can never be represented by any simulacrum of the present (people walking down a street, the sun going down), but can only be grasped through the analysis of rhythms (people walking down a street through time, the sun’s movement through time).
[edit]
Presence
Lefebvre describes presence as the “facts of both nature and culture, at the same time sensible, affective and moral rather than imaginary” (author’s emphasis). (Elden and Moore translation) Rhythmanalysis stresses that presence is of an innately temporal character and can never be represented by any simulacrum of the present (people walking down a street, the sun going down), but can only be grasped through the analysis of rhythms (people walking down a street through time, the sun’s movement through time).
[edit]Present
The present consists of one’s sensory perceptions. Lefebvre frequently warns of “the trap of the present” wherein the present is always trying to pass itself off as presence, the rhythmanalytical truth of a situation. “The trap of the present” relies on false representation. Lefebvre argues that the present engages in a commodification of reality when it successfully passes itself off as presence.
[edit]Characteristics of rhythms
Lefebvre describes four alignments of rhythms. They are:
Arrhythmia, conflict or dissonance between or among two or more rhythms, such as might occur (biologically) in an ill person;
Polyrhythmia, co-existence of two or more rhythms without the conflict or dissonance that suggests arrhythmia;
Eurhythmia, constructive interaction between or among two or more rhythms, such as occurs in healthy creatures;
Isorhythmia, the rarest association between rhythms, implies equivalence of repetition, measure and frequency.
[edit]Editions
Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life. London: Continuum, 2004.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Rhythmanalysis is a collection of essays by Marxist sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre. The book outlines a method for analyzing the rhythms of urban spaces and the effects of those rhythms on the inhabitants of those spaces. It builds on his past work, with which he argued space is a production of social practices.
The book is considered to be the fourth volume in his series Critique of Everyday Life. Published in 1992 after his death, Rhythmanalysis is the last book Lefebvre wrote.
General concept of rhythm
Lefebvre’s concept of rhythm concerns the repetition of a measure at a frequency. He identifies two kinds of rhythms: cyclical rhythms, which involve simple intervals of repetition, and alternating (or linear) rhythms. An example of a cyclical rhythm would be day fading into night, and night brightening into day; a linear rhythm might be the flow of information from a television set. Additionally, rhythms may be nested within each other; for example, the broadcast of the local news at set intervals throughout the day, throughout the week, is an example of a nested rhythm. In a less abstract fashion (or perhaps only abstract in a different fashion), Lefebvre asserts that rhythms exist at the intersection of place, time and the expenditure of energy.
Lefebvre posits that the human body is composed of several rhythms; in order to observe rhythms outside of the body, the rhythmanalyst must use his or her own rhythms as a reference to unify the rhythms under analysis. Properly put, the rhythm is the conjunction of the rhythmanalyst and the object of the analysis.
The act of rhythmanalysis
Rhythms are only perceptible through the traditional five senses; accordingly, it is possible to conceptualize rhythms as being composed of sense triggers (smells, sights, sounds, etc.) Lefebvre cautions against this conceptualization however; he specifically notes that rhythm is not meant to refer always to its more traditional referents, musical and dance rhythm (although it could, so long as the rhythmanalysis concerned either music or dancing). He also cautions against taking the mere repetition of a movement to indicate a rhythm.
The object of rhythmanalysis is to access the obscure property of the rhythm called ‘presence.’ The sensory events through which the rhythmanalyst perceives the rhythm are called ‘simulacra,’ or simply ‘the present.’ The need for rhythmanalysis arises out of the propensity of the present to simulate presence.
[edit]Presence
Lefebvre describes presence as the “facts of both nature and culture, at the same time sensible, affective and moral rather than imaginary” (author’s emphasis). (Elden and Moore translation) Rhythmanalysis stresses that presence is of an innately temporal character and can never be represented by any simulacrum of the present (people walking down a street, the sun going down), but can only be grasped through the analysis of rhythms (people walking down a street through time, the sun’s movement through time).
[edit]
Presence
Lefebvre describes presence as the “facts of both nature and culture, at the same time sensible, affective and moral rather than imaginary” (author’s emphasis). (Elden and Moore translation) Rhythmanalysis stresses that presence is of an innately temporal character and can never be represented by any simulacrum of the present (people walking down a street, the sun going down), but can only be grasped through the analysis of rhythms (people walking down a street through time, the sun’s movement through time).
[edit]Present
The present consists of one’s sensory perceptions. Lefebvre frequently warns of “the trap of the present” wherein the present is always trying to pass itself off as presence, the rhythmanalytical truth of a situation. “The trap of the present” relies on false representation. Lefebvre argues that the present engages in a commodification of reality when it successfully passes itself off as presence.
[edit]Characteristics of rhythms
Lefebvre describes four alignments of rhythms. They are:
Arrhythmia, conflict or dissonance between or among two or more rhythms, such as might occur (biologically) in an ill person;
Polyrhythmia, co-existence of two or more rhythms without the conflict or dissonance that suggests arrhythmia;
Eurhythmia, constructive interaction between or among two or more rhythms, such as occurs in healthy creatures;
Isorhythmia, the rarest association between rhythms, implies equivalence of repetition, measure and frequency.
[edit]Editions
Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life. London: Continuum, 2004.
The Topology of Time
It's natural to think that time can be represented by a line. But a line has a shape. What shape should we give to the line that represents time? This is a question about the topology, or structure, of time.
One natural way to answer our question is to say that time should be represented by a single, straight, non-branching, continuous line that extends without end in each of its two directions. This is the “standard topology” for time. But for each of the features attributed to time in the standard topology, two interesting questions arise: (a) does time in fact have that feature? and (b) if time does have the feature in question, is this a necessary or a contingent fact about time?
Questions about the topology of time appear to be closely connected to the issue of Platonism versus Reductionism with Respect to Time. For if Reductionism is true, then it seems likely that time's topological features will depend on contingent facts about the relations among things and events in the world, whereas if Platonism is true, so that time exists independently of whatever is in time, then time will presumably have its topological properties as a matter of necessity. But even if we assume that Platonism is true, it's not clear just what topological properties should be attributed to time.
Consider the question of whether time should be represented by a line without a beginning. Aristotle has argued (roughly) that time cannot have a beginning on the grounds that in order for time to have a beginning, there must be a first moment of time, but that in order to count as a moment of time, that allegedly first moment would have to come between an earlier period of time and a later period of time, which is inconsistent with its being the first moment of time. (Aristotle argues in the same way that time cannot have an end.)
It is also worth asking whether time must be represented by a single line. Perhaps we should take seriously the possibility of time's consisting of multiple time streams, each one of which is isolated from each other, so that every moment of time stands in temporal relations to other moments in its own time stream, but does not bear any temporal relations to any moment from another time stream. Likewise we can ask whether time could correspond to a branching line, or to a closed loop, or to a discontinuous line. And we can also wonder whether one of the two directions of time is in some way priveleged, in a way that makes time itself asymmetrical.
Suggestions for Further Reading: On the beginning and end of time: Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII; Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, esp. pp. 75ff.; Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time, Ch. V; Swinburne, “The Beginning of the Universe;” Swinburne, Space and Time. On the linearity of time: Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time, Ch. III; Swinburne, Space and Time. On the direction of time: Price, “A Neglected Route to Realism About Quantum Mechanics;”Price, Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time; Savitt, Time's Arrows Today; and Sklar, Space, Time, and Spacetime. And finally, on all of these topics: Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time.
One natural way to answer our question is to say that time should be represented by a single, straight, non-branching, continuous line that extends without end in each of its two directions. This is the “standard topology” for time. But for each of the features attributed to time in the standard topology, two interesting questions arise: (a) does time in fact have that feature? and (b) if time does have the feature in question, is this a necessary or a contingent fact about time?
Questions about the topology of time appear to be closely connected to the issue of Platonism versus Reductionism with Respect to Time. For if Reductionism is true, then it seems likely that time's topological features will depend on contingent facts about the relations among things and events in the world, whereas if Platonism is true, so that time exists independently of whatever is in time, then time will presumably have its topological properties as a matter of necessity. But even if we assume that Platonism is true, it's not clear just what topological properties should be attributed to time.
Consider the question of whether time should be represented by a line without a beginning. Aristotle has argued (roughly) that time cannot have a beginning on the grounds that in order for time to have a beginning, there must be a first moment of time, but that in order to count as a moment of time, that allegedly first moment would have to come between an earlier period of time and a later period of time, which is inconsistent with its being the first moment of time. (Aristotle argues in the same way that time cannot have an end.)
It is also worth asking whether time must be represented by a single line. Perhaps we should take seriously the possibility of time's consisting of multiple time streams, each one of which is isolated from each other, so that every moment of time stands in temporal relations to other moments in its own time stream, but does not bear any temporal relations to any moment from another time stream. Likewise we can ask whether time could correspond to a branching line, or to a closed loop, or to a discontinuous line. And we can also wonder whether one of the two directions of time is in some way priveleged, in a way that makes time itself asymmetrical.
Suggestions for Further Reading: On the beginning and end of time: Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII; Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, esp. pp. 75ff.; Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time, Ch. V; Swinburne, “The Beginning of the Universe;” Swinburne, Space and Time. On the linearity of time: Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time, Ch. III; Swinburne, Space and Time. On the direction of time: Price, “A Neglected Route to Realism About Quantum Mechanics;”Price, Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time; Savitt, Time's Arrows Today; and Sklar, Space, Time, and Spacetime. And finally, on all of these topics: Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time.
16.1.10
Computer Sound Transformation
http://www.trevorwishart.co.uk/transformation.html#F7
Spectral cleaning was developed using a comparative method - part of the spectrum deemed to be (mainly) noise (and, in some options, part of the spectrum deemed to be clear signal) being compared with the rest of the signal and appropriate subtractions of data or other modifications made.
From a musical point of view, the most innovative early new developments were spectral banding, a rather complicated 'filter', which enabled the spectrum to be divided into bands, and various simple amplitude-varying (and in fact frequency-shifting) processes to be applied to the bands, spectral tracing and spectral blurring.
Spectral tracing simply retains the N channels with the loudest (highest amplitude) data on a window-by-window basis. If N is set to c. 1/8th the number of channels used in the PVOC analysis, this can sometimes function as an effective noise reduction procedure (the value of N which works best depends on the signal). When N is much smaller than this, and a complex signal is processed, a different result transpires. The small number of PVOC channels selected by the process will vary from window to window. Individual partials will drop out, or suddenly appear, in this elect set. As a result, the output sound will present complex weaving melodies produced by the preserved partials as they enter (or leave) the elect set. This procedure is used in Tongues of Fire (14).
Spectral blurring is an analogous process in the time dimension. The change in frequency information over time is averaged - in fact, the frequency and amplitude data in the channels is sampled at each Nth window, and the frequency and amplitude data for intervening channels generated by simple interpolation. This leads to a blurring or 'washing out' of the spectral clarity of the source.
Arpeggiation of the spectrum (a procedure inspired by vocal synthesis examples used by Steve McAdams at IRCAM to demonstrate aural streaming) was produced by 'drawing' a low frequency simple waveform onto the spectrum. This oscillator rises and falls between two limit values - values of frequency in the original spectrum - specified by the user. Where this waveform crosses the spectral windows, the channel (or surrounding group of channels, or all the channels above, or all those below) is amplified. Spectral plucking was introduced to add further amplitude emphasis (and an element of time-decay of the emphasized data) to the selected channels.
timestretch or compression and its range
segment density and its range
segment size
segment transposition and its range
segment amplitude and its range
segment splice-length
segment spatial position
segment spatial scatter and its range
segment timing randomisation
segment search-range in the source
Spectral cleaning was developed using a comparative method - part of the spectrum deemed to be (mainly) noise (and, in some options, part of the spectrum deemed to be clear signal) being compared with the rest of the signal and appropriate subtractions of data or other modifications made.
From a musical point of view, the most innovative early new developments were spectral banding, a rather complicated 'filter', which enabled the spectrum to be divided into bands, and various simple amplitude-varying (and in fact frequency-shifting) processes to be applied to the bands, spectral tracing and spectral blurring.
Spectral tracing simply retains the N channels with the loudest (highest amplitude) data on a window-by-window basis. If N is set to c. 1/8th the number of channels used in the PVOC analysis, this can sometimes function as an effective noise reduction procedure (the value of N which works best depends on the signal). When N is much smaller than this, and a complex signal is processed, a different result transpires. The small number of PVOC channels selected by the process will vary from window to window. Individual partials will drop out, or suddenly appear, in this elect set. As a result, the output sound will present complex weaving melodies produced by the preserved partials as they enter (or leave) the elect set. This procedure is used in Tongues of Fire (14).
Spectral blurring is an analogous process in the time dimension. The change in frequency information over time is averaged - in fact, the frequency and amplitude data in the channels is sampled at each Nth window, and the frequency and amplitude data for intervening channels generated by simple interpolation. This leads to a blurring or 'washing out' of the spectral clarity of the source.
Arpeggiation of the spectrum (a procedure inspired by vocal synthesis examples used by Steve McAdams at IRCAM to demonstrate aural streaming) was produced by 'drawing' a low frequency simple waveform onto the spectrum. This oscillator rises and falls between two limit values - values of frequency in the original spectrum - specified by the user. Where this waveform crosses the spectral windows, the channel (or surrounding group of channels, or all the channels above, or all those below) is amplified. Spectral plucking was introduced to add further amplitude emphasis (and an element of time-decay of the emphasized data) to the selected channels.
timestretch or compression and its range
segment density and its range
segment size
segment transposition and its range
segment amplitude and its range
segment splice-length
segment spatial position
segment spatial scatter and its range
segment timing randomisation
segment search-range in the source
Mathematics as Intuition
For intuitionists like L.E.J. Brouwer (1881-1966) the subject matter of mathematics is intuited non-perceptual objects and constructions, these being introspectively self-evident. Indeed, mathematics begins with a languageless activity of the mind which moves on from one thing to another but keeps a memory of the first as the empty form of a common substratum of all such moves. Subsequently, such constructions have to be communicated so that they can be repeated — i.e. clearly, succinctly and honestly, as there is always the danger of mathematical language outrunning its content.
How does this work in practice? Intuitionist mathematics employs a special notation, and makes more restricted use of the law of the excluded middle (that something cannot be p' and not-p' at the same time). A postulate, for example, that the irrational number pi has an infinite number of unbroken sequences of a hundred zeros in its full expression would be conjectured as undecidable rather than true or false. But the logic is very different, particularly with regard to negation, the logic being a formulation of the principles employed in the specific mathematical construction rather than applied generally. But what of the individual, self-evident experiences which raise Wittgenstein problems of private languages? Do, moreover, we have to construct and then derive a contradiction for a proposition like a square circle cannot exist rather than conceive the impossibility of one existing? And wouldn't consistency be more easily tested by developing constructions further rather than waiting for self-evidence to appear?
http://www.textetc.com/theory/truth-in-mathematics.html
How does this work in practice? Intuitionist mathematics employs a special notation, and makes more restricted use of the law of the excluded middle (that something cannot be p' and not-p' at the same time). A postulate, for example, that the irrational number pi has an infinite number of unbroken sequences of a hundred zeros in its full expression would be conjectured as undecidable rather than true or false. But the logic is very different, particularly with regard to negation, the logic being a formulation of the principles employed in the specific mathematical construction rather than applied generally. But what of the individual, self-evident experiences which raise Wittgenstein problems of private languages? Do, moreover, we have to construct and then derive a contradiction for a proposition like a square circle cannot exist rather than conceive the impossibility of one existing? And wouldn't consistency be more easily tested by developing constructions further rather than waiting for self-evidence to appear?
http://www.textetc.com/theory/truth-in-mathematics.html
The use of space in musical performance.
the use of space in musical performance....around the potentialities of audible space.
http://gilmore2.chem.northwestern.edu/articles/steven_art.htm
The spatial location of musical sources has often been a concern in the theatre. There are many examples of on or off stage bands in opera, here the concerns are clearly with the shaping of the dramatic action. However, musical space has clearly been an area of interest for a wide range of composers within the Western Canon.
The age of the machine brought new inspiration for defining space with sound.The ‘intonarumori’ or noise instruments of Luigi Russolo (1885-1947), inspired originally by the sounds of war, where designed to project noises into an auditorium. His futurist manifesto 'The Art of Noises' rejoiced in the acoustic and spatial character of the modern mechanised environment.
Motion is a device for musical expression and as such has become a musical paradigm. Musical space is often measured in the dimensions of pitch, harmony, texture and rhythm or time. Musical motion occurs within this space. In addition to this usage of space, much musical discussion is embued with dynamic qualities of human emotion. These ideas have contributed to the multilayered, metaphoric connotations of space whose relations are wholly paradigmatic or associative.
Traditionally, musical aesthetics has dealt with the issues of meaning and aesthetic value. I would like to look at some contemporary perspectives on the use of space in electroacoustic music. Much in musical language is arbitrary and its function rests on convention. It is likely, however, that our auditory perception of space and its relation to meaning is grounded in every day experience of the physical world. Moreover, the expressive gap filled by the metaphor of motion in music may be closed when actual spatial motion becomes a part of compositional practice.
....
Stockhausen uses three orchestras situated around the audience. In this piece he attempts, according to Worner[5] , to establish a polyphony in time and in space. Here we see space compared with the traditional compositional elements of pitch, harmony and time. Polyphony of space suggests the interplay of two or more sound spaces as well as space being one of the musical properties of a melodic line. Stockhausen adopts a seemingly formalist approach to space. For him the property of space is an entirely intrinsic property. He uses space in order to better articulate the temporal complexities of his composition.
....
Wittgenstein’s discussions on musical understanding may help to shed some light on the contrast between the abstract and the referential in musical language. Wittgenstein suggests that understanding a musical theme is easier than understanding a sentence. This is because the music does not bear complex relations of linguistic referents that are found in the words of a sentence. Still we understand a sentence in much the same way we understand a musical theme. Space like other musical parameters does not bear semantic meaning and yet we can interpret audible space by applying our experience and an innate or learned set of governing rules. For Wittgenstein music is highly abstract and yet we understand it by understanding the system of rules within which it operates. Our ability to understand audible space is a product of our experience and understanding, in Wittgenstein’s terms, this implies a degree of expertise. This is true of both language and music.
...
Denis Smalley:
space as one of his ‘indicative fields’. He posits the argument that musical apprehension of sounds exists on a continuum between merely informational use of sound and a more aesthetically involving, interactive engagement with the subtle qualities of a sound.
These aspects of space are those which lie within the interactive relationships between the listener and musical sounds. His discussion centres on the indicative character of space and its interpretation by the listener.
He describes the indeterminacy arising from what he calls the ‘superimposed space’ which is the combination of the properties of the composed space and the listening space. This may result in the alteration of the indicative interpretation of the piece.
describes three indicative properties of space:
. The principal property is ‘spatial texture’. This concerns the topology of the audible space. Size, he argues, is the most important indicative property. It may express a range of meanings which are fundamental to human experience: he outlines the contrasts between 'intimacy and immensity' and 'confinement and vastness'. He suggests the psychological or emotional states that may result from either of these extremes. Other aspects of spatial texture include the density of distribution of sounds, the spatial contiguousness of sounds and the movement of sounds.
The second spatial property which may bear meaning is ‘spatial orientation’. He employs the metaphors of 'sound confronting from ahead or stealing up from behind' to describe the potential of spatial orientation. Interestingly, he follows Wishart[8] in suggesting that there is no differentiation between left and right. This position is countered by Truax[9] and Wallin[10] as I will outline later. He does, however, include the case of circumfrentially enclosing sound which Wishart conspicuously excludes from his seemingly exhaustive enumeration of spatial possibilities.
The final spatial property in Smalley’s exposition is ‘temporal space’. This describes the evolution of space over time resulting in impressions of stability, permanence or rapid change. Smalley coins the term ‘spatio-morphology’ to describe the evolution of the spatial components, described above, in electroacoustic composition.
Trevor Wishart :
His stated objective is to analyse the vocabulary of spatial motion without attempting to define its language. comment on the meaning-bearing aspects of each type of motion. He denies that beyond the subtle aspects of left and right handedness, there can be any significant differentiation between sources coming from or moving to either side of the listener.
This position is refuted by N. C. Wallin in his book 'Biomusicology - Neurophysiological, Neuropsychological and Evolutionary Perspectives on the Origins and Purposes of Music'[12] in which he details the functional asymmetry of the hemispheres of the brain and its influence on the perception and processing of musical sound.
Barry Truax takes up this point. He details the role of the two hemispheres in the different levels of hearing that may be involved in the perception of different The location of the speech function in the left hemisphere and this hemisphere’s popular association with analytical processes stands in contrast to the supposed synthetic and associative powers of the right hemisphere.sounds.
l however, that listeners cannot share a common experience or interpretation of audible space. Or, indeed, that the composers intentions will not, in some form, be perceived by the listener. Obviously, the fact that space has been employed successfully by so many composers in the past, and that it continues to be explored as a musical device, means that it has earned its place in musical language and will surely continue to grow in importance. Theoretical interest in the use of space in composition has occupied much space in the literature of contemporary music. Analysis of its use and exploration of its potential by theorists and composers presents great scope for research and development.
The technical difficulties outlined above are being continually addressed by research and advanced electroacoustic practice. Great progress is being made both in the predictable use of electroacoustic devices and in the treatment and control of acoustic spaces. New auditorium designs, sensitive to the needs of electroacoustic performance must surely help to narrow the gap between the composers spatial design and its performance realisation. New techniques for spatial encoding and advanced signal processing[16] for multi-channel playback are presenting a viable way forward for the development of spatial composition. These developments do not inhibit the performance of live sound diffusion, where this is seen as the aesthetically appropriate approach to the realisation of the inherent spatial properties of a piece. On the contrary, they will provide the performer with new and flexible tools and enhance the expressive possibilities of this form of live interpretation.
Being aware of the limitations and potential pitfalls of spatial expression can only improve our understanding of this exciting dimension in musical language. This understanding must help us to explore the wealth of musical material that exploits audible space and open the horizons to new and innovative work in the future.
http://gilmore2.chem.northwestern.edu/articles/steven_art.htm
The spatial location of musical sources has often been a concern in the theatre. There are many examples of on or off stage bands in opera, here the concerns are clearly with the shaping of the dramatic action. However, musical space has clearly been an area of interest for a wide range of composers within the Western Canon.
The age of the machine brought new inspiration for defining space with sound.The ‘intonarumori’ or noise instruments of Luigi Russolo (1885-1947), inspired originally by the sounds of war, where designed to project noises into an auditorium. His futurist manifesto 'The Art of Noises' rejoiced in the acoustic and spatial character of the modern mechanised environment.
Motion is a device for musical expression and as such has become a musical paradigm. Musical space is often measured in the dimensions of pitch, harmony, texture and rhythm or time. Musical motion occurs within this space. In addition to this usage of space, much musical discussion is embued with dynamic qualities of human emotion. These ideas have contributed to the multilayered, metaphoric connotations of space whose relations are wholly paradigmatic or associative.
Traditionally, musical aesthetics has dealt with the issues of meaning and aesthetic value. I would like to look at some contemporary perspectives on the use of space in electroacoustic music. Much in musical language is arbitrary and its function rests on convention. It is likely, however, that our auditory perception of space and its relation to meaning is grounded in every day experience of the physical world. Moreover, the expressive gap filled by the metaphor of motion in music may be closed when actual spatial motion becomes a part of compositional practice.
....
Stockhausen uses three orchestras situated around the audience. In this piece he attempts, according to Worner[5] , to establish a polyphony in time and in space. Here we see space compared with the traditional compositional elements of pitch, harmony and time. Polyphony of space suggests the interplay of two or more sound spaces as well as space being one of the musical properties of a melodic line. Stockhausen adopts a seemingly formalist approach to space. For him the property of space is an entirely intrinsic property. He uses space in order to better articulate the temporal complexities of his composition.
....
Wittgenstein’s discussions on musical understanding may help to shed some light on the contrast between the abstract and the referential in musical language. Wittgenstein suggests that understanding a musical theme is easier than understanding a sentence. This is because the music does not bear complex relations of linguistic referents that are found in the words of a sentence. Still we understand a sentence in much the same way we understand a musical theme. Space like other musical parameters does not bear semantic meaning and yet we can interpret audible space by applying our experience and an innate or learned set of governing rules. For Wittgenstein music is highly abstract and yet we understand it by understanding the system of rules within which it operates. Our ability to understand audible space is a product of our experience and understanding, in Wittgenstein’s terms, this implies a degree of expertise. This is true of both language and music.
...
Denis Smalley:
space as one of his ‘indicative fields’. He posits the argument that musical apprehension of sounds exists on a continuum between merely informational use of sound and a more aesthetically involving, interactive engagement with the subtle qualities of a sound.
These aspects of space are those which lie within the interactive relationships between the listener and musical sounds. His discussion centres on the indicative character of space and its interpretation by the listener.
He describes the indeterminacy arising from what he calls the ‘superimposed space’ which is the combination of the properties of the composed space and the listening space. This may result in the alteration of the indicative interpretation of the piece.
describes three indicative properties of space:
. The principal property is ‘spatial texture’. This concerns the topology of the audible space. Size, he argues, is the most important indicative property. It may express a range of meanings which are fundamental to human experience: he outlines the contrasts between 'intimacy and immensity' and 'confinement and vastness'. He suggests the psychological or emotional states that may result from either of these extremes. Other aspects of spatial texture include the density of distribution of sounds, the spatial contiguousness of sounds and the movement of sounds.
The second spatial property which may bear meaning is ‘spatial orientation’. He employs the metaphors of 'sound confronting from ahead or stealing up from behind' to describe the potential of spatial orientation. Interestingly, he follows Wishart[8] in suggesting that there is no differentiation between left and right. This position is countered by Truax[9] and Wallin[10] as I will outline later. He does, however, include the case of circumfrentially enclosing sound which Wishart conspicuously excludes from his seemingly exhaustive enumeration of spatial possibilities.
The final spatial property in Smalley’s exposition is ‘temporal space’. This describes the evolution of space over time resulting in impressions of stability, permanence or rapid change. Smalley coins the term ‘spatio-morphology’ to describe the evolution of the spatial components, described above, in electroacoustic composition.
Trevor Wishart :
His stated objective is to analyse the vocabulary of spatial motion without attempting to define its language. comment on the meaning-bearing aspects of each type of motion. He denies that beyond the subtle aspects of left and right handedness, there can be any significant differentiation between sources coming from or moving to either side of the listener.
This position is refuted by N. C. Wallin in his book 'Biomusicology - Neurophysiological, Neuropsychological and Evolutionary Perspectives on the Origins and Purposes of Music'[12] in which he details the functional asymmetry of the hemispheres of the brain and its influence on the perception and processing of musical sound.
Barry Truax takes up this point. He details the role of the two hemispheres in the different levels of hearing that may be involved in the perception of different The location of the speech function in the left hemisphere and this hemisphere’s popular association with analytical processes stands in contrast to the supposed synthetic and associative powers of the right hemisphere.sounds.
l however, that listeners cannot share a common experience or interpretation of audible space. Or, indeed, that the composers intentions will not, in some form, be perceived by the listener. Obviously, the fact that space has been employed successfully by so many composers in the past, and that it continues to be explored as a musical device, means that it has earned its place in musical language and will surely continue to grow in importance. Theoretical interest in the use of space in composition has occupied much space in the literature of contemporary music. Analysis of its use and exploration of its potential by theorists and composers presents great scope for research and development.
The technical difficulties outlined above are being continually addressed by research and advanced electroacoustic practice. Great progress is being made both in the predictable use of electroacoustic devices and in the treatment and control of acoustic spaces. New auditorium designs, sensitive to the needs of electroacoustic performance must surely help to narrow the gap between the composers spatial design and its performance realisation. New techniques for spatial encoding and advanced signal processing[16] for multi-channel playback are presenting a viable way forward for the development of spatial composition. These developments do not inhibit the performance of live sound diffusion, where this is seen as the aesthetically appropriate approach to the realisation of the inherent spatial properties of a piece. On the contrary, they will provide the performer with new and flexible tools and enhance the expressive possibilities of this form of live interpretation.
Being aware of the limitations and potential pitfalls of spatial expression can only improve our understanding of this exciting dimension in musical language. This understanding must help us to explore the wealth of musical material that exploits audible space and open the horizons to new and innovative work in the future.
Art for Heiddeggar +postmodernism + Technology for him
ART:
Art means know-how: not technique as such, but the means of "bringing forth". And when, as at the present time, the gods have fled and there is no world to open up, great art was no longer possible. Heidegger indeed felt that great art was already on the wane when aesthetics appeared with Plato and Aristotle.
he believes art has an unique relationship to truth, but that relationship is not spelt out. No doubt Heidegger felt that his philosophy went beyond aesthetics, but then the larger political arena is not without its problems: Heidegger came to despise Nazi propaganda, but never renounced his allegiance to National Socialism.
POSTMODERNISM:
Martin Heidegger, whose meditations on art, technology, and the withdrawal of being they regularly cite and comment upon. Heidegger's contribution to the sense of de-realization of the world stems from oft repeated remarks such as: “Everywhere we are underway amid beings, and yet we no longer know how it stands with being” (Heidegger 2000, 217), and “precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence” (Heidegger 1993, 332). Heidegger sees modern technology as the fulfillment of Western metaphysics, which he characterizes as the metaphysics of presence. From the time of the earliest philosophers, but definitively with Plato, says Heidegger, Western thought has conceived of being as the presence of beings, which in the modern world has come to mean the availability of beings for use. In fact, as he writes in Being and Time, the presence of beings tends to disappear into the transparency of their usefulness as things ready-to-hand (Heidegger 1962, 95-107). The essence of technology, which he names “the enframing,” reduces the being of entities to a calculative order (Heidegger 1993, 311-341). Hence, the mountain is not a mountain but a standing supply of coal, the Rhine is not the Rhine but an engine for hydro-electric energy, and humans are not humans but reserves of manpower. The experience of the modern world, then, is the experience of being's withdrawal in face of the enframing and its sway over beings. However, humans are affected by this withdrawal in moments of anxiety or boredom, and therein lies the way to a possible return of being, which would be tantamount to a repetition of the experience of being opened up by Parmenides and Heraclitus.
Heidegger sees this as the realization of the will to power, another Nietzschean conception, which, conjoined with the eternal return, represents the exhaustion of the metaphysical tradition (Heidegger 1991a, 199-203). For Heidegger, the will to power is the eternal recurrence as becoming, and the permanence of becoming is the terminal moment of the metaphysics of presence. On this reading, becoming is the emerging and passing away of beings within and among other beings instead of an emergence from being. Thus, for Heidegger, Nietzsche marks the end of metaphysical thinking but not a passage beyond it, and therefore Heidegger sees him as the last metaphysician in whom the oblivion of being is complete (Heidegger 1991a, 204-206; 1991b, 199-203). Hope for a passage into non-metaphysical thinking lies rather with Hölderlin, whose verses give voice to signs granted by being in its withdrawal (Heidegger 1994, 115-118). While postmodernists owe much to Heidegger's reflections on the non-presence of being and the de-realization of beings through the technological enframing, they sharply diverge from his reading of Nietzsche.
Many postmodern philosophers find in Heidegger a nostalgia for being they do not share. They prefer, instead, the sense of cheerful forgetting and playful creativity in Nietzsche's eternal return as a repetition of the different and the new. Some have gone so far as to turn the tables on Heidegger, and to read his ruminations on metaphysics as the repetition of an original metaphysical gesture, the gathering of thought to its “proper” essence and vocation (see Derrida 1989). In this gathering, which follows the lineaments of an exclusively Greco-Christian-German tradition, something more original than being is forgotten, and that is the difference and alterity against which, and with which, the tradition composes itself. Prominent authors associated with postmodernism have noted that the forgotten and excluded “other” of the West, including Heidegger, is figured by the Jew (see Lyotard 1990, and Lacoue-Labarthe 1990). In this way, they are able to distinguish their projects from Heidegger's thinking and to critically account for his involvement with National Socialism and his silence about the Holocaust, albeit in terms that do not address these as personal failings. Those looking for personal condemnations of Heidegger for his actions and his “refusal to accept responsibility” will not find them in postmodernist commentaries. They will, however, find many departures from Heidegger on Nietzsche's philosophical significance (see Derrida 1979), and many instances where Nietzsche's ideas are critically activated against Heidegger and his self-presentation.
TECHNOLOGY:
Technology means
The essence of technology never could be revealed to human as essence of everything else and technology is bringing forth and revealing and unconcealed where Alethea, truth happens...the revealing that rules technology is challenging. Modern technology essence is enframing; gathering together of the setting-upon that sets upon man. techne which is defined "the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts", i the means for sourcing true forms and ideas that exist before the figure we perceive.Plus he mentioned how technology has changed man's relationship not only in earth, but also to being itself. and there is nothing too technological about the true essence of technology.
And to human, his enframing is putting in position of man to reveal the actual as original; so the essence of modern technology is putting in position of man to reveal the actual as original and still present, if concealed... the truth exists outside of human work. man is inconsiderate as we do not know the origins; to find them we must listen but not simply obey. The great danger for martin is technology becomes determined of it's truth, rather than humen becoming knowing of concealed truth. The "saving power" of modern technology is thinking and seeing unfolding it's essence rather than become transfixed in the will to master in technology as an instrument. the truth is constellation, the stellar course of the mystery distant from human perception. And thus the essential unfolding of modern technology may not lead us to the ultimate truth... in fact modern technology likes to be dominant to the things, therefore not only it will not reveal the truth, but also some how cover it under it's flourish demonstration.
and then I said:
System creativity (design a creative/ self conscious system) as a response to Heidegger point of view to technology; He like Karl Marx didn’t think of technology as a creative variable therefore the relationship between technology and human was always in a shadow. of mechanical materialism. however, Bergson and after him Deuluze introduce an alive system and then a creative organism as a machine and therefore as technology.
CONSIDER TECHNOLOGY AS WHAT IS MEANT OR BEING SAID NOT A THING..THE OBJECT HAS NO INTRINSIC TRUTH OR STATUS IT IS MERELY A RECONCILLIATION OF TECHNIQUE..MACHINES ARE PRIMITIVE STONES RECOMPOSSED / ASSIMILATED PRODUCTS..THEY CONTAIN A FORM OF DECEIT AS WE FORGET HOW AND OUR TEXTURES..THEY ARE AT A POINT METHODS OF FACILITATING AND NOTHING MORE..WE HAVE NOT ADAPTED TO THIS IDEA OF THE EXQUISIT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN US AND MODES OF BEING.
Art means know-how: not technique as such, but the means of "bringing forth". And when, as at the present time, the gods have fled and there is no world to open up, great art was no longer possible. Heidegger indeed felt that great art was already on the wane when aesthetics appeared with Plato and Aristotle.
he believes art has an unique relationship to truth, but that relationship is not spelt out. No doubt Heidegger felt that his philosophy went beyond aesthetics, but then the larger political arena is not without its problems: Heidegger came to despise Nazi propaganda, but never renounced his allegiance to National Socialism.
POSTMODERNISM:
Martin Heidegger, whose meditations on art, technology, and the withdrawal of being they regularly cite and comment upon. Heidegger's contribution to the sense of de-realization of the world stems from oft repeated remarks such as: “Everywhere we are underway amid beings, and yet we no longer know how it stands with being” (Heidegger 2000, 217), and “precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence” (Heidegger 1993, 332). Heidegger sees modern technology as the fulfillment of Western metaphysics, which he characterizes as the metaphysics of presence. From the time of the earliest philosophers, but definitively with Plato, says Heidegger, Western thought has conceived of being as the presence of beings, which in the modern world has come to mean the availability of beings for use. In fact, as he writes in Being and Time, the presence of beings tends to disappear into the transparency of their usefulness as things ready-to-hand (Heidegger 1962, 95-107). The essence of technology, which he names “the enframing,” reduces the being of entities to a calculative order (Heidegger 1993, 311-341). Hence, the mountain is not a mountain but a standing supply of coal, the Rhine is not the Rhine but an engine for hydro-electric energy, and humans are not humans but reserves of manpower. The experience of the modern world, then, is the experience of being's withdrawal in face of the enframing and its sway over beings. However, humans are affected by this withdrawal in moments of anxiety or boredom, and therein lies the way to a possible return of being, which would be tantamount to a repetition of the experience of being opened up by Parmenides and Heraclitus.
Heidegger sees this as the realization of the will to power, another Nietzschean conception, which, conjoined with the eternal return, represents the exhaustion of the metaphysical tradition (Heidegger 1991a, 199-203). For Heidegger, the will to power is the eternal recurrence as becoming, and the permanence of becoming is the terminal moment of the metaphysics of presence. On this reading, becoming is the emerging and passing away of beings within and among other beings instead of an emergence from being. Thus, for Heidegger, Nietzsche marks the end of metaphysical thinking but not a passage beyond it, and therefore Heidegger sees him as the last metaphysician in whom the oblivion of being is complete (Heidegger 1991a, 204-206; 1991b, 199-203). Hope for a passage into non-metaphysical thinking lies rather with Hölderlin, whose verses give voice to signs granted by being in its withdrawal (Heidegger 1994, 115-118). While postmodernists owe much to Heidegger's reflections on the non-presence of being and the de-realization of beings through the technological enframing, they sharply diverge from his reading of Nietzsche.
Many postmodern philosophers find in Heidegger a nostalgia for being they do not share. They prefer, instead, the sense of cheerful forgetting and playful creativity in Nietzsche's eternal return as a repetition of the different and the new. Some have gone so far as to turn the tables on Heidegger, and to read his ruminations on metaphysics as the repetition of an original metaphysical gesture, the gathering of thought to its “proper” essence and vocation (see Derrida 1989). In this gathering, which follows the lineaments of an exclusively Greco-Christian-German tradition, something more original than being is forgotten, and that is the difference and alterity against which, and with which, the tradition composes itself. Prominent authors associated with postmodernism have noted that the forgotten and excluded “other” of the West, including Heidegger, is figured by the Jew (see Lyotard 1990, and Lacoue-Labarthe 1990). In this way, they are able to distinguish their projects from Heidegger's thinking and to critically account for his involvement with National Socialism and his silence about the Holocaust, albeit in terms that do not address these as personal failings. Those looking for personal condemnations of Heidegger for his actions and his “refusal to accept responsibility” will not find them in postmodernist commentaries. They will, however, find many departures from Heidegger on Nietzsche's philosophical significance (see Derrida 1979), and many instances where Nietzsche's ideas are critically activated against Heidegger and his self-presentation.
TECHNOLOGY:
Technology means
The essence of technology never could be revealed to human as essence of everything else and technology is bringing forth and revealing and unconcealed where Alethea, truth happens...the revealing that rules technology is challenging. Modern technology essence is enframing; gathering together of the setting-upon that sets upon man. techne which is defined "the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts", i the means for sourcing true forms and ideas that exist before the figure we perceive.Plus he mentioned how technology has changed man's relationship not only in earth, but also to being itself. and there is nothing too technological about the true essence of technology.
And to human, his enframing is putting in position of man to reveal the actual as original; so the essence of modern technology is putting in position of man to reveal the actual as original and still present, if concealed... the truth exists outside of human work. man is inconsiderate as we do not know the origins; to find them we must listen but not simply obey. The great danger for martin is technology becomes determined of it's truth, rather than humen becoming knowing of concealed truth. The "saving power" of modern technology is thinking and seeing unfolding it's essence rather than become transfixed in the will to master in technology as an instrument. the truth is constellation, the stellar course of the mystery distant from human perception. And thus the essential unfolding of modern technology may not lead us to the ultimate truth... in fact modern technology likes to be dominant to the things, therefore not only it will not reveal the truth, but also some how cover it under it's flourish demonstration.
and then I said:
System creativity (design a creative/ self conscious system) as a response to Heidegger point of view to technology; He like Karl Marx didn’t think of technology as a creative variable therefore the relationship between technology and human was always in a shadow. of mechanical materialism. however, Bergson and after him Deuluze introduce an alive system and then a creative organism as a machine and therefore as technology.
CONSIDER TECHNOLOGY AS WHAT IS MEANT OR BEING SAID NOT A THING..THE OBJECT HAS NO INTRINSIC TRUTH OR STATUS IT IS MERELY A RECONCILLIATION OF TECHNIQUE..MACHINES ARE PRIMITIVE STONES RECOMPOSSED / ASSIMILATED PRODUCTS..THEY CONTAIN A FORM OF DECEIT AS WE FORGET HOW AND OUR TEXTURES..THEY ARE AT A POINT METHODS OF FACILITATING AND NOTHING MORE..WE HAVE NOT ADAPTED TO THIS IDEA OF THE EXQUISIT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN US AND MODES OF BEING.
Being and Time with Heideggar
Being and Time
What is "being" asks Heidegger in Being and Time? His answer was to distinguish what it is for beings to be beings (Sein) from the existence of entities in general (Seindes). Seindes was "ontic" — i.e. makes reference, allows us to talk about things. It was simply a "place holder" and applied to relations, processes, events, etc. Sein was more fundamental: Heidegger was concerned with something he felt had been overlooked since the pre-Socratics. Descartes, for example, simply sidestepped the problem of ontology (philosophy of being) by dividing the world into three (God, the exterior world, and mental processes) and depicting the essentials of the exterior world in terms of time and the three spatial dimensions. This leads him in all kinds of difficulties, and evaded the question we must ask as to what being really is.
Heidegger was very idiosyncratic. He indulged in extended word play, and employed his own spelling, vocabulary and syntax. One famous coining was Dasein: literally "to be there". Dasein has no essence beyond what it can make itself be — i.e. no fixed nature or inveterate tendency. Man alone has Dasein, and he cannot escape it. Nor is there anything more fundamentally human, to which he can dedicate his life. The world is disclosed to us through and in Dasein: disclosed without mediation by concepts, propositions and inner mental states. Truth is Dasein's disclosedness. We are "thrown" into the world. Heidegger rejected the correspondence theory of truth, and regarded as a scandal the continual attempt by philosophy to centre knowledge on mental processes.
What is this Dasein? Start with things in the world, said Heidegger: everyday things like tools, materials, workspace. Are they not there for a purpose, to do something? They do not exist in isolation, waiting for the philosopher to extract the essence "tool", for instance, and then worry about enclosing and defining the term properly. Their complex relationships with other things (people and material objects) is what is most relevant about them, and this cuts across the usual boundaries of objective/subjective, animate/inanimate, or past/present/future. Time is not an abstract entity, something in which we are borne passively along, but an opportunity to do something. Or it is for us human beings who have Dasein (choice) and we therefore owe things in the world a duty of care (Sorge).
But if we continually define ourselves, we also change the way we regard the world. And that in turn redefines us. Nothing is innate, not even Dasein. Other things in the world (Seindes) may be relatively fixed but man is different. Above all he faces conscience, dread, awareness of death, all of which call man back to himself, to question his authenticity. Hence the importance of these in Heidegger's writings, which he viewed ontologically, not merely matters of psychological or sociological explanation.{3}
What is "being" asks Heidegger in Being and Time? His answer was to distinguish what it is for beings to be beings (Sein) from the existence of entities in general (Seindes). Seindes was "ontic" — i.e. makes reference, allows us to talk about things. It was simply a "place holder" and applied to relations, processes, events, etc. Sein was more fundamental: Heidegger was concerned with something he felt had been overlooked since the pre-Socratics. Descartes, for example, simply sidestepped the problem of ontology (philosophy of being) by dividing the world into three (God, the exterior world, and mental processes) and depicting the essentials of the exterior world in terms of time and the three spatial dimensions. This leads him in all kinds of difficulties, and evaded the question we must ask as to what being really is.
Heidegger was very idiosyncratic. He indulged in extended word play, and employed his own spelling, vocabulary and syntax. One famous coining was Dasein: literally "to be there". Dasein has no essence beyond what it can make itself be — i.e. no fixed nature or inveterate tendency. Man alone has Dasein, and he cannot escape it. Nor is there anything more fundamentally human, to which he can dedicate his life. The world is disclosed to us through and in Dasein: disclosed without mediation by concepts, propositions and inner mental states. Truth is Dasein's disclosedness. We are "thrown" into the world. Heidegger rejected the correspondence theory of truth, and regarded as a scandal the continual attempt by philosophy to centre knowledge on mental processes.
What is this Dasein? Start with things in the world, said Heidegger: everyday things like tools, materials, workspace. Are they not there for a purpose, to do something? They do not exist in isolation, waiting for the philosopher to extract the essence "tool", for instance, and then worry about enclosing and defining the term properly. Their complex relationships with other things (people and material objects) is what is most relevant about them, and this cuts across the usual boundaries of objective/subjective, animate/inanimate, or past/present/future. Time is not an abstract entity, something in which we are borne passively along, but an opportunity to do something. Or it is for us human beings who have Dasein (choice) and we therefore owe things in the world a duty of care (Sorge).
But if we continually define ourselves, we also change the way we regard the world. And that in turn redefines us. Nothing is innate, not even Dasein. Other things in the world (Seindes) may be relatively fixed but man is different. Above all he faces conscience, dread, awareness of death, all of which call man back to himself, to question his authenticity. Hence the importance of these in Heidegger's writings, which he viewed ontologically, not merely matters of psychological or sociological explanation.{3}
an object in the midst of other objects
Franz Fanon tells us that he "came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, [his] spirit filled with the desire to attain the source of the world" and then found that he was "an object in the midst of other objects."
As the world, if it is matter, Is impenetrable.
So spoke of the existence of things,
An unmanageable pantheon
Absolute, but they say
Arid.
A city of the corporations
Glassed
In dreams
And images
And the pure joy
Of the mineral fact
Tho it is impenetrable
As the world, if it is matter,
Is impenetrable.
George Oppen, Of Being Numerous
An unmanageable pantheon
Absolute, but they say
Arid.
A city of the corporations
Glassed
In dreams
And images
And the pure joy
Of the mineral fact
Tho it is impenetrable
As the world, if it is matter,
Is impenetrable.
George Oppen, Of Being Numerous
alain badiou on art
http://www.lacan.com/symptom6_articles/badiou.html
Below are the 15 points by Alain Badiou to which Jean referred during her lecture in the first week of the kit theory course. The question Badiou started his talk with is the following: How can contemporary art avoid being formalist romantic? By form he possibly means organization, anything you need to make art with, in the general sense of the word. It is not form as opposed to content. By romantic he means for example when one considers our reality to be bad, when one strives a better reality, when nihilism is the dominant mode of thinking.
1. Art is not the sublime [inspiring, inspirational] descent of the infinite into the finite abjection of the body and sexuality. On the contrary, it is the production of an infinite subjective series, through the finite means of a material subtraction.
2. Art cannot merely be the expression of a particularity (be it ethnic or personal). Art is the impersonal production of a truth that is addressed to everyone.
3. Art is the process of a truth, and this truth is always the truth of the sensible or sensual, the sensible qua sensible. This means†: the transformation of the sensible into an happening of the Idea.
4. There is necessarily a plurality of arts, and however we may imagine the ways in which the arts might intersect there is no imaginable way of totalising this plurality.
5. Every art develops from an impure form, and the progressive purification of this impurity shapes the history both of a particular artistic truth and of its exhaustion.
6. The subjects of an artistic truth are the works which compose it.
7. This composition is an infinite configuration, which in our own contemporary artistic context is a generic totality.
8. The real of art is ideal [Èelle] impurity conceived through the immanent process of its purification. In other words, the raw material of art is determined by the contingent inception of a form. Art is the secondary formalisation of the advent of a hitherto formless form.
9. The only maxim of contemporary art is: do not be imperial. This also means: do not be democratic, if democracy implies conformity with the imperial idea of political liberty.
10. Non-imperial art is necessarily abstract art, in this sense: it abstracts itself from all particularity, and formalises this gesture of abstraction.
11. The abstraction of non-imperial art is not concerned with any particular public or audience. Non-imperial art is related to a kind of aristocratic-proletarian ethic: it does what it says, without distinguishing between kinds of people.
12. Non-imperial art must be as rigorous as a mathematical demonstration, as surprising as an ambush in the night, and as elevated as a star.
13. Today art can only be made from the starting point of that which, as far as Empire is concerned, doesn't exist. Through its abstraction, art renders this in-existence visible. This is what governs the formal principle of every art: the effort to render visible to everyone that which, for Empire (and so by extension for everyone, though from a different point of view), doesn't exist.
14. Since it is sure of its ability to control the entire domain of the visible and the audible via the laws governing commercial circulation and democratic communication, Empire no longer censures anything. All art, and all thought, is ruined when we accept this permission to consume, to communicate and to enjoy. We should become the pitiless censors of ourselves.
15. It is better to do nothing than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire already recognises as existent.
alain badiou
Below are the 15 points by Alain Badiou to which Jean referred during her lecture in the first week of the kit theory course. The question Badiou started his talk with is the following: How can contemporary art avoid being formalist romantic? By form he possibly means organization, anything you need to make art with, in the general sense of the word. It is not form as opposed to content. By romantic he means for example when one considers our reality to be bad, when one strives a better reality, when nihilism is the dominant mode of thinking.
1. Art is not the sublime [inspiring, inspirational] descent of the infinite into the finite abjection of the body and sexuality. On the contrary, it is the production of an infinite subjective series, through the finite means of a material subtraction.
2. Art cannot merely be the expression of a particularity (be it ethnic or personal). Art is the impersonal production of a truth that is addressed to everyone.
3. Art is the process of a truth, and this truth is always the truth of the sensible or sensual, the sensible qua sensible. This means†: the transformation of the sensible into an happening of the Idea.
4. There is necessarily a plurality of arts, and however we may imagine the ways in which the arts might intersect there is no imaginable way of totalising this plurality.
5. Every art develops from an impure form, and the progressive purification of this impurity shapes the history both of a particular artistic truth and of its exhaustion.
6. The subjects of an artistic truth are the works which compose it.
7. This composition is an infinite configuration, which in our own contemporary artistic context is a generic totality.
8. The real of art is ideal [Èelle] impurity conceived through the immanent process of its purification. In other words, the raw material of art is determined by the contingent inception of a form. Art is the secondary formalisation of the advent of a hitherto formless form.
9. The only maxim of contemporary art is: do not be imperial. This also means: do not be democratic, if democracy implies conformity with the imperial idea of political liberty.
10. Non-imperial art is necessarily abstract art, in this sense: it abstracts itself from all particularity, and formalises this gesture of abstraction.
11. The abstraction of non-imperial art is not concerned with any particular public or audience. Non-imperial art is related to a kind of aristocratic-proletarian ethic: it does what it says, without distinguishing between kinds of people.
12. Non-imperial art must be as rigorous as a mathematical demonstration, as surprising as an ambush in the night, and as elevated as a star.
13. Today art can only be made from the starting point of that which, as far as Empire is concerned, doesn't exist. Through its abstraction, art renders this in-existence visible. This is what governs the formal principle of every art: the effort to render visible to everyone that which, for Empire (and so by extension for everyone, though from a different point of view), doesn't exist.
14. Since it is sure of its ability to control the entire domain of the visible and the audible via the laws governing commercial circulation and democratic communication, Empire no longer censures anything. All art, and all thought, is ruined when we accept this permission to consume, to communicate and to enjoy. We should become the pitiless censors of ourselves.
15. It is better to do nothing than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire already recognises as existent.
alain badiou
13.1.10
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